Criticisms Against Ethical Theories

disapprovals leveled against estim adequate to(p) Theories 1. Criticisms leveled against Consequentialism. Consequentialism is nates on the consequences of natural subprogramions. It is sometimes c bedlyed a teleological surmise, from the Greek word telos, heart goal. According to consequentialism, exercises ar proficient-hand(a) or disparage dep cobblers lasting on whether their consequences nurture the goal. The goal (or, the dear) enkindle be something like the felicity of apiece(prenominal) mass or the sp see of peace and safety. Anything which contrisolelyes to that goal is rightlyfield and whateverthing which does non is prostitute.Actions atomic number 18 estimate to seduce no clean-living repute in themselves (no rightness or wrongness), and just when get moral appreciate from whether or non they lead to the goal. John Stuart Mill was a celebrated consequentialist. Consequentialists would rate that obscureing large number is non ri ght or wrong in itself, it depends on the verbotencome. Killing an innocent child would be a mischievously thing beca engage it would decrease the happiness of its family and have no intelligent yields. Killing a terrorist would be a good thing because, although it would overturn his family, it would authorize spate safer.The signifi standt criticism of consequentialism is that it would each(prenominal)ow any puzzle oution in involvement of a good cause, charge actions that approximately mountain would say were clearly mor eithery wrong, much(prenominal) as torture, killing children, genocide, and so on 2. Criticisms leveled against Deontology The word deontology comes from the Greek word deon, meaning duty. According to this guess, it is your duty to do actions which be right and not do those which are wrong. Actions are opinion to be right or wrong in themselves. For example, killing bulk and lying are wrong, sharing with separatewises who are in request is right.Immanuel Kant was a famous deontologist. E. g. While trekking in the Andes you come across a freedom fighter leader who has captured 20 local villagers. The guerilla says if you exit shoot whiz hostage he go forth let the other 19 go free. If you refuse to shoot, he will kill self-coloured 20. In the thought investigate the guerilla leader is telling the truth and you have only two choices to shoot, or to refuse. Choose to shoot, and you are a consequentialist, walk out by saving the 19 innocent large number.Choose to refuse, and you are a deontologist, motivated by the concomitant that it is always wrong to kill an innocent mortal. The main criticism of deontology is that it is selfish, a way of eliminateing getting your hands dirty (in a moral sense) temporary hookup lock away exclusivelyowing terrible things to happen. For instance, in the thought experiment you would not have shot anybody except 20 innocent pile would even so die. You could have preve nted this turn upcome if you werent afr laming to take any transgression on yourself. 3. Criticisms of Utilitarianism DistastefulnessBy far and and away the just ab appear common criticism of utilitarianism croupe be reduced s intimate to I dont like it or It doesnt suit my way of valueing. For an example of this, heres something from person who energy prefer to remain nameless. Producing the greatest good for the greatest number is graceful as long as you are not disadvantageing various(prenominal) you re whole in aloney love in the process. For instance, with the trolley military post, I would quite kill 5 tribe on the main track than my overprotect on the spur track. Utilitarianism runs into problems when sentiment is involved Utilitarianism is maintain to be faulty in the way it withdraws us to estimate ab break through all kinds of actions to apply the felicific potassium hydrogen tartrate in disregard to any feared distaste of the result. For example, some renders or potence actions are (to a non-utilitarian) morally unthinkable Utilitarianism does indeed have something to say on this issue otherwise it would rede that the action of this extra respective(prenominal) was of no splendor. I advise it as a im ploughshareialityfulness of everyday utility, that it does not arbitrarily discount take vizor depending on some detail of the reconcile of affairs all interests count imply and fairly. The occurrence that opp unmatchednts of utilitarianism admit that they wont even ascertain some situations seems to me to be most damning to their credibility, and indicative of their general unreason on matters respectable. The argument from distaste is often expressed as a suggestion that utilitarianism doesnt provide large support for exclusiveistics rights. that what is a right, and what is its vindication? If the unspoiledification of a right depends on its tendency to bring up happiness and prevent low-d stimul ate, because it is but redundant since this is the sole purpose of utility.And if rights arent warrant in these terms, how are they proficientified what on earth are they really good for? Of what use are they? It is generally implant that the prop nonpareilnt of honest rights has very(prenominal) unclear thinking as to what rights are and why they (should) experience and it is in that locationfore of unclear importance that utilitarianism does not support them. Doesnt utilitarianism imply that, if we found a drug which had the sole effect of producing happiness, we ought to mass produce and follow finished it?And, since happiness is just an emotion which can be chemically induced, isnt it a bit silly to make it the advancedest coordinate objective? It is kind of curious that to a greater extent people will accept the pursuit of happiness as one of sprightlinesss fundamental entitlements, to that degree should suddenly develop ascetic inclinations as soon as the quarry appears obtainable. It seems they dont have a problem with soulfulness trying to achieve happiness, earlier they are only concerned when that someone has a level-headed prospect of success in their attempts.Perhaps their regress with unhappiness would be satisfied by personally abstaining from joy but, if it goes foster such that they would attempt to prevent exclusives from attaining happiness even at no cost to others, thence (from a utilitarian point of view) such people are despotical and a menace to society. It is possible that many peoples crime to the idea of everlasting happiness is ca utilize by incomplete construeation of the issue. It could be that people have become so jaded by fictive claims for the desirability of various intentional objects that they believe that drug-induced happiness simply would not be durably satisfying.Since any notion of happiness worthy of the name includes that of satisfaction, it follows that a truly happy person cannot be d issatisfied, so this problem can never arise. Happiness, in the utilitarian sense, includes the unsusceptibility from suffering. A charge of smallness for pleasure can perhaps be made, if our only frame of part is the knowledge of felicific assures currently achievable, but it is altogether less plausible against the depths of suffering currently experienced by the worlds less fortunate beings. ImpossibilityThe southward most common criticism of utilitarianism is that it is unfeasible to apply that happiness ( and so on cannot be quantified or measured, that there is no way of calculating a trade-off surrounded by intensity and extent, or intensity and probability (etc), or compare happiness to suffering. If happiness was not measurable, words like happier or happiest could have no meaning I was happier yesterday than I am now would make no sense at all it can only have the meaning which we (or most of us, at any rate) know that it has if we meet that happiness can be measured and compared. one should face the fact that goods are not necessarily intersubstitutable and consider the case, for instance, of an intransigent bring in holder who, when his highway of limes is to be destroyed for the motorway, pick outs for 1p compensation, since nothing can be compensation. 2 (One is reminded of the story of the mother handing out home-baked cookies as a special treat to her family. The youngest child, on finding his cookie to be fill to smaller than the others, smashes it up and storms out in tears. In his disappointment, he interprets a fine gift as an affront, and he would rather make things worse than better but then hes only a child.Adults, of course, have much less obvious and to a greater extent subtle pith of smashing their cookies. ) Initially, it seems very odd that the landowner should ask for a penny. If nothing can be compensation, why does he not ask for nothing? What use is this tiny amount of money? outlying(prenominal) from sugg esting that the trees are invaluable, it suggests that any money he could get for them is worthless to him But, we whitethorn notwithstanding ask, why the penny? And then we realize its a souvenir a chip in a psychological game (often called low-down me ).One can imagine the penny being carried virtually by the ex-landowner, and produced to evict pity from those unfortunates he manages to convince to listen to his story. That will be his best effort at compensating himself. Now cypher the scenario is amended slightly imagine the landowners daughter is dying from a terminal disease that the motorways supporters provide to pay for the new and expensive cure (which the landowner could not otherwise afford) in ex tack for the land and that they will not proceed without his permission. argon we still to presume that nothing can be compensation for his trees, not even the life of his daughter?Or will the landowner judge that his daughters life is much(prenominal) outstanding th an his pretty view? It seems likely. But suppose not suppose he chooses to pass on the trees and lose his daughter. Does this show that the value of the lime avenue isnt convertible? Of course not, just that he value the trees more(prenominal) than his offspring. If the two different set were inconvertible, he would have no way to nail down one way or the other no way to choose betwixt them. The fact that people can and do weigh-up and trade-off values, for all types of things, shows that it is both possible and practical to do so.In the authentic scenario, the sensible thing to do would be to ask for enough money to buy a new bit of land, and to plant a new avenue of limes on it but, since the principle of utility does not imply the absence of fools, this criticism has no effect, and we packnt consider this matter further. Impracticality The ternary most common criticism is that it is too difficult to apply that we cannot calculate all the effects for all the individu als (either because of the large number of individuals involved, and/or because of the uncertainty).The principle of utility is, essentially, a description of what makes something right or wrong so in order for it to fail, someone must(prenominal) produce an example of something which is utilizable but obviously wrong. The principle does not imply that we can calculate what is right or wrong completely accurately, in advance, or at all It does not harm the principle of utility at all just to comment that it is difficult for us to work out what is right it is except a lament against the gentlemans gentlemane condition.The idea of practicality is often used to suggest a problem exists in the theory, when it fact it does not. For example how far does one, on a lower floor utilitarianism, have to research into the possibilities of maximally beneficent action, including prevention? 3 The answer is simple, and entirely obvious as far as it is useful to do so That is, far eno ugh so that we get the optimal trade-off between planning and implementing, so that we maximize our effectiveness as agents.The does imply that, in some cases, it may not be best to apply the felicific densification at all if the problem is one that we have faced many times forrader, and always reached the same conclusion or if the case presents itself as an emergency, and isnt open to extended consideration we can forego the calculus and act immediately. Insufficiency (of scope) One argument which some people propose as being more sensible than other criticisms, is that utilitarianism is fine, so far as it goes, but that it fails to consider some sources of value, and that it will therefore produce the wrong results when these different sources troth. at that place is potential for confusion here sometimes utilitarianism is used to specifically for hedonistic utilitarianism and, sometimes, it means a specific class of ethical theory (something like value-maximizing consequen tialism) under this meaning, an ethical theory which held the existence of waxy forks as supremely valuable, and therefore tried to maximize their number, would be charge plate fork utilitarianism. 5 So, theories which have other intrinsic values than happiness and exemption from suffering can be accommodated indoors a utilitarian scheme.As for those other things that are suggested as having value, there are a some worth mentioning life, friendship, and knowledge among them. I think it is far-famed that these things are valued, but that they overly generally create happiness I suggest the reason that they are valued is precisely because they promote happiness. But, if they didnt, would we still value them? Does someone who suffers too much still value their life? Surely not, or else there would be no suicides. Do we value a friendship if we get no pleasure from it?On the contrary, it is more likely that we would define our friends as those people near whom we enjoyed being. And is it worthwhile accomplishment and philosophising, if our knowledge is never of any use at all? Or, rather, is it just so much meta-physical stamp collecting? The case against these other goals is quite clear. 4. A Critique of Ethical Egoism Ethical vanity, like all exclusively subjective philosophies, is prone to constant self-contradiction because it supports all individuals self interests.It as tumefy can lead to very unpleasant conclusions, such as choosing not to intervene in a crime against another. Egoists have difficulty sagacity anything that does not deal with them, which is one reason why ethical egoism is so impractical for people who are very aware of the world. The very legitimacy of the theory is often called into question because it prevents its own adherents from taking reasonable stances on study governmental and kindly issues and cannot in itself work these issues. 5. Criticisms against Ethical RelativismA common argument against relativism suggests that it inherently contradicts, refutes, or stultifies itself the statement all is copulation classes either as a relation back statement or as an absolute one. If it is relative, then this statement does not shape out absolutes. If the statement is absolute, on the other hand, then it provides an example of an absolute statement, proving that not all truths are relative. However, this argument against relativism only applies to relativism that fixateions truth as relativei. e. pistemological/truth-value relativism. More specifically, it is only strong forms of epistemological relativism that can come in for this criticism as there are many epistemological relativists who posit that some aspects of what is regarded as true are not universal, unless still accept that other universal truths exist (e. g. gas honors). However, such censures need to be carefully justified, or anything goes. another(prenominal) argument against relativism posits a natural police force. Simply put , the physical universe works under basic principles the Laws of oddball. well-nigh contend that a natural Moral Law may also exist, for example as solicitd by Richard Dawkins in The God guile (2006)35 and addressed by C. S. Lewis in Mere Christianity (1952). 36 Dawkins said I think we face an follow but much more sinister repugn from the left hand, in the shape of cultural relativism the view that scientific truth is only one kind of truth and it is not to be especially privileged. 37 excursion from the general legitimacy of relativism, critics say it undermines morality, possibly resulting in anomie and complete fond Darwinism.Relativism denies that harming others is wrong in any absolute sense. The majority of relativists, of course, consider it immoral to harm others, but relativist theory allows for the opposite belief. In short, if an individual can believe it wrong to harm others, he can also believe it rightno matter what the part. The problem of negation also aris es. If everyone with differing opinions is right, then no one is. Thus instead of saying all beliefs (ideas, truths, etc. ) are equally valid, one aptitude just as well say all beliefs are equally worthless. (see article on Doublethink).Another argument is that if relativism presupposes that all beliefs are equally valid, it then implies that any belief system holding itself to be the only valid one is untrue, which is a contradiction. An argument made by Hilary Putnam,38 among others, states that some forms of relativism make it impossible to believe one is in error. If there is no truth beyond an individuals belief that something is true, then an individual cannot hold their own beliefs to be irrational or mis taken. A linkd criticism is that relativizing truth to individuals destroys the distinction between truth 6. Criticism of Virtue moralityAccording to critics, a major problem with the theory is the difficulty of establishing the temper of the fair plays, especially as different people, cultures and societies often have vastly different opinions on what constitutes a virtue. nigh proponents counter-argue that any character trait defined as a virtue must be universally regarded as a virtue for all people in all times, so that such cultural relativism is not relevant. Others, however, argue that the concept of virtue must indeed be relative and grounded in a particular time and place, but this in no way negates the value of the theory, merely keeps it current.Another objection is that the theory is not action-guiding, and does not focus on what sorts of actions are morally permitted and which ones are not, but rather on what sort of qualities someone ought to foster in order to become a good person. Thus, a virtue theorist may argue that someone who commits a murder is severely lacking in several important virtues (e. g. compassion and fairness, among others), but does proscribe murder as an inherently immoral or impermissible sort of action, and t he theory is therefore useless as a universal norm of acceptable select uitable as a base for legislation. Virtue theorists may retort that it is in fact possible to base a discriminatory system on the moral notion of virtues rather than rules (modern theories of law related to Virtue Ethics are known as virtue jurisprudence, and focus on the importance of character and human excellence as opposed to moral rules or consequences). They argue that Virtue Ethics can also be action-guiding through observance of virtuous agents as examplars, and through the life-long process of moral learning, for which quick-fix rules are no substitute.Some have argued that Virtue Ethics is self-centred because its primary coil concern is with the agents own character, whereas morality is supposed to be about other people, and how our actions affect other people. Thus, any theory of ethics should require us to consider others for their own sake, and not because particular actions may benefit us. Some argue that the solid concept of personal well-being (which is essentially just self-interest) as an ethical master value is mistaken, especially as its very personal constitution does not admit to comparisons between individuals.Proponents counter that virtues in themselves are concerned with how we respond to the needs of others, and that the good of the agent and the good of others are not two separate aims, but both result from the exercise of virtue. Other critics are concerned that Virtue Ethics leaves us hostage to luck, and that it is unfair that some people will be well- jugd and receive the help and encouragement they need to attain moral maturity, while others will not, through no fault of their own.Virtue Ethics, however, embraces moral luck, lean that the vulnerability of virtues is an essential feature of the human condition, which makes the attainment of the good life all the more valuable. Cultural diversity Some criticize virtue ethics in relation to the diffic ulty involved with establishing the nature of the virtues. They argue that different people, cultures, and societies often have vastly different perspectives on what constitutes a virtue. For example, many would have once considered a virtuous woman to be quiet, servile, and industrious.This conception of female virtue no longer holds true in many modern societies. Alasdair MacIntyre responds to this criticism, by arguing that any account of the virtues must indeed be generated out of the partnership in which those virtues are to be practiced The very word ethics implies ethos. That is to say that the virtues are, and necessarily must be, grounded in a particular time and place. What counts as virtue in fourth century Athens would be a ludicrous exceed to proper behavior in twenty-first century Toronto, and vice versa.But, the important question in virtue ethics as to what kind of person one ought to be, which may be answered differently depending on the ethos, can still give rea l direction and purpose to people. Lack of moral rules Another criticism of virtue ethics is that it lacks absolute moral rules which can give clear guidance on how to act in specific circumstances such as abortion, embryo research, and euthanasia. Martha Nussbaum responds to this criticism, by saying that there are no absolute rules. In a war situation, for example, the rule that you must not kill an innocent person is impractical.According to Nussbaum, it is the virtues that are absolutes, and we should pass for them. If elected leaders strive for them, things will go well. On the issue of embryo research, Alasdair MacIntyre suggests that people first need to understand the friendly situation in which although many people are negative about embryotic stem-cell research, they are not upset with the fact that thousands of embryos substantially die at various stages in the IVF (in vitro fertilization) process. Then, says MacIntyre, people need to approach the issue with virtues s uch as wisdom, right ambition, and temperance.Thus, some virtue ethicists argue that it is possible to base a discriminative system on the moral notion of virtues rather than on rules. 7. Critiques of Normative Contractarianism Many limited reviews have been leveled against particular ratifyarian theories and against disregardarianism as a framework for normative thought about justice or morality. (See the first appearance on modern approaches to the mixer slue. ) Jean Hampton criticized Hobbes in her book Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition, in a way that has direct relevance to contemporary foreshortenarianism.Hampton argues that the characterization of individuals in the state of nature leads to a dilemma. Hobbes state of nature as a potential war of all against all can be generated either as a result of passions (greed and fear, in particular) or rationality (prisoners dilemma reasoning, in which the rational players each choose to renege on agreements made with each other). But if the passions account is correct, then Hampton argues, the arriveors will still be motivated by these passions afterwards the societal melt off is drawn up, and so will fail to comply with it.And if the rationality account is correct, then rational actors will not comply with the sociable contract any more than they will cooperate with each other before it is made. This critique has an analog for Gauthiers theory, in that Gauthier must also claim that without the contract individuals will be stuck in some socially sub-optimal situation that is bad enough to motivate them to make concessions to each other for some agreement, further the reason for their inability to cooperate without the contract cannot continue to operate after the contract is made.Gauthiers proposed solution to this problem is to argue that individuals will choose to dispose themselves to be constrained (self-interest) maximizers rather than straightforward (self-interest) maximizers, that i s, to retrain themselves not to think first of their self-interest, but rather to dispose themselves to keep their agreements, provided that they find themselves in an environment of like-minded individuals. But this solution has been found dubitable by many commentators. (See Vallentyne, 1991) Hampton also objects to the contemporary contractarian assumption that fundamental interaction is merely instrumentally valuable.She argues that if interaction were only valuable for the fruits of cooperation that it bears for self-interested cooperators, then it would be unlikely that those cooperators could successfully solve the compliance problem. In short, they are likely not to be able to motivate morality in themselves without some natural inclination to morality. Interestingly, Hampton agrees with Gauthier that contractarianism is right to require any moral or governmental norms to appeal to individuals self-interest as a limitation on self-sacrifice or development of any individual .In an important article, On Being the Object of Property, black law professor Patricia Williams offers a critique of the contract metaphor itself. Contracts require independent agents who are able to make and carry out promises without the aid of others. Historically, while white men have been treated as these nice wills of contract theory, Blacks and women have been treated as anti-will dependent and irrational. Both ideals are false whole people, she says, are dependent on other whole people.But by formation some as contractors and others as incompetent of contract, whole classes of people can be excluded from the realm of justice. This point has been taken up by other critics of contractarianism, such as Eva Kittay (1999) who points out that not only are dependents such as children and disabled people left out of consideration by contractarian theories, but their caretakers needs and interests will tend to be underestimated in the contract, as well.David Hume was an early cri tic of the hardiness of social contract theory, arguing against any theory based on a historic contract, on the grounds that one should not be springiness by the consent of ones ancestors. He also questioned to what extent the fall-back state of nature which underlies most social contract theory is actually historically accurate, or whether it is just a hypothetical or possible situation. Others have pointed out that, with an assumed initial position which is sufficiently dire (such as that posited by Hobbes), Contractarianism may lead to the legitimization of Totalitarianism (as Hobbes himself foresaw).Some commentators have argued that a social contract of the type described cannot be considered a legitimate contract at all, on the grounds that the agreement is not fully impulsive or without coercion, because a government can and will use tear against anyone who does not wish to enter into the contract. In Rousseaus conception of the social contract, even individuals who disag ree with elements of the social contract must nevertheless agree to die hard by it or risk punishment (they must be coerce to be free).It is argued that this idea of force negates the requirement that a contract be entered into voluntarily, or at least to permit individuals to abstain from submission into a contract. In response, it has been countered that the name contract is perhaps misleading (social compact has been suggested as an alternative), and that anyway individuals explicitly indicate their consent simply by remaining in the jurisdiction. Either way, social contract theory does seem to be more in accordance with contract law in the time of Hobbes and Locke (based on a mutual exchange of benefits) than in our own.Other critics have questioned the assumption that individuals are always self-interested, and that they would actually indigence the benefits of society supposedly offered by the contract. A further objection sometimes raised is that Contractarianism is more of a descriptive theory than a normative guide or a justification. 8. Critiques of Rights Theory Critiques of rights come in two forms. The first is an attack on the substance of doctrines that give rights a primaeval place.These critiques allege that the marrow of such doctrines is, in one way or other, malformed or unjustified. Here we find, for example, the criticism that natural rights doctrines are so much flat roamion, and that utilitarian rights tend to be implausibly weak. The due south form of critique attacks the row of rights itself. The objection here is that it is inappropriate or counterproductive to express at least some kinds of normative concerns in terms of rights. We should, according to the second form of critique, reduce or avoid rights lecturing. Critiques of Rights Doctrine Marx attacked the substance of the revolutionary eighteenth century American and French political documents that proclaimed the fundamental rights of man liberty, equality, security , property, and the free exercise of religion. Marx objected that these alleged rights derive from a false conception of the human individual as unrelated to others, as having interests can be defined without reference to others, and as always potentially in scrap with others.The rights-bearing individual is an isolated monas withdrawn behind his tete-a-tete interests and whims and separated from the community. (Marx 1844, 146) The right of property, Marx asserted, exemplifies the isolating and anti-social character of these alleged rights of man. On the one hand, the right of property is the right to keep others at a distance the licit equivalent of a burred wire fence. On the other hand, the right of property allows an owner to reassign his resources at his own pleasure and for his own gain, without regard even for the hopeless need for those resources elsewhere.Similarly, Marx held that the much-celebrated individual right to liberty reinforces selfishness. Those who are a scribed the right to do what they wish so long as they do not hurt others will perpetuate a culture of egoistic obsession. As for equality, the execution of equal rights in a loose state merely distracts people from noticing that their equality is purely formal a society with formally equal rights will continue to be divided by huge inequalities in economic and political power. Finally, these so-called natural rights are in fact not natural to humans at all.They are simply the defining elements of the rules of the modern mode of production, perfectly suited to fit each individual into the capitalist machine. Communitarians (Taylor, Walzer, MacIntyre, Sandel) sound several of the same themes in their criticisms of contemporary liberal and libertarian theories. The communitarians object that humans are not, as such theories assume, antecedently individuated. Nozicks state of nature theorizing, for example, errs in presuming that individuals outside of a stable, state-governed socia l order will develop the autonomous capacities that make them deserving of rights.Nor should we attempt, as in Rawlss original position, to base an argument for rights on what individuals would choose in regardion from their particular identities and community attachments. There is no way to establish a strong political theory on what all rational agents want in the abstract. Rather, theorists should look at the particular social contexts in which real people live their lives, and to the meanings that specific goods carry within different cultures.This criticism continues by acc victimisation liberal and libertarian theories of being falsely universalistic, in insisting that all societies should bend themselves to fit within a standard-sized cage of rights. Insofar as we should admit rights into our understanding of the world at all, communitarians say, we should see them as part of ongoing practices of social self-interpretation and negotiation and so as rules that can belatedl yen world-shakingly between cultures. These kinds of criticisms have been discussed in detail (e. g. Gutmann 1985, Waldron 1987b, Mulhall and Swift 1992). Their validity turns on weightingy issues in moral and political theory. What can be said here is that a common theme in most of these criticismsthat prominent rights doctrines are in some way excessively individualistic or atomisticneed not cut against any theory merely because it uses the style of rights. Ignatieff (2003, 67) errs, for example, when he charges that rights row cannot be parsed or translated into a nonindividualistic, communitarian framework.It presumes moral individualism and is nonsensical outside that assumption. As we saw above, the lyric of rights is able to accommodate rightholders who are individuals as such, but also individuals considered as members of assemblys, as well as groups themselves, states, peoples, and so on. Indeed the non-individualistic potential of rights- address is more than a forma l possibility. The doctrine of global human rightsthe modern cousin of eighteenth century natural rights theoryascribes several significant rights to groups.The international Convention against Genocide, for example, forbids actions intending to destroy any national, ethnic, racial or religious group and both of the human rights Covenants ascribe to peoples the right to self-determination. such(prenominal) examples show that the lyric of rights is not individualistic in its essence. Critiques of the Language of Rights The language of rights can scorn the charge that it is necessarily complicit with individualism.However, critics have accused rights talk of impeding social progress Our rights talk, in its absoluteness promotes unrealistic expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common ground. In its silence concerning responsibilities, it seems to condone acceptance of the benefi ts of living in a egalitarian social welfare state, without accepting the equal personal and civic obligations.In its insularity, it shuts out potentially important aids to the process of self-correcting learning. All of these traits promote mere assertion over reason-giving. Glendon (1991, 14) here draws out some of the noisome practical consequences of the popular connection between rights and conclusive reasons that we saw above. Since rights assertions suggest conclusive reasons, people can be tempted to assert rights when they want to end a discussion instead of continuing it.One plays a right as a trump card when one has run out of arguments. Similarly, the ready availability of rights language may lead parties initially at odds with each other toward confrontation instead of negotiation, as each side escalates an arms-race of rights assertions that can only be resolved by a superior authority like a court. One line of feminist theory has picked up on this line of criticis m, identifying the peremptory and rigidifying talk about of rights with the confrontational masculine voice. (Gilligan 1993)It is not inevitable that these unfortunate tendencies will punish those who make use of the language of rights. As we have seen, it may be plausible to hold that each right is absolute only within a elaborately gerrymandered area. And it may be possible to produce deep theories to justify why one has the rights that one asserts. However, it is plausible that the actual use of rights talk does have the propensities that Glendon suggests. It seems no accident that America, the land of rights, is also the land of litigation.Another deleterious consequence of rights talk that Glendon picks out is its tendency to act the moral focus toward persons as rightholders, instead of toward persons as bearers of responsibilities. This critique is authentic by ONeill (1996, 12753 2002, 2734). A focus on rightholders steers moral reasoning toward the perspective of recip ience, instead of toward the traditional active ethical questions of what one ought to do and how one ought to live. Rights talk also leads those who use it to neglect important virtues such as courage and beneficence, which are duties to which no rights correspond.Finally, the use of rights language encourages people to make impractical demands, since one can assert a right without attending to the desirability or even the possibility of burdening others with the corresponding obligations. Criticisms such as ONeills do not target the language of rights as a whole. They aim squarely at the passive rights, and especially at claim-rights, instead of at the active privileges and powers. Nevertheless, it is again plausible that the spread of rights talk has encouraged the tendencies that these criticisms suggest.The modern talk over of rights is characteristically deployed by those who see themselves or others as potential recipients, entitled to insist on certain benefits or protectio ns. Describing fundamental norms in terms of rights has benefits as well as dangers. The language of rights can give clear expression to elaborate buildings of freedom and authority. When corporate in particular doctrines, such as in the international human rights documents, the language of rights can express in accessible terms the standards for minimally acceptable treatment that individuals can demand from those with power over them.Rights are also associated with historical movements for greater liberty and equality, so assertions of rights in pursuit of justice can carry a resonance that other appeals lack. Whether these benefits of using rights language over balance the dangers remains a live question in moral, political and heavy theory. The Critique of Rights The critique of rights developed by deprecative licit theorists has five basic elements o The discourse of rights is less useful in securing imperfect social change than liberal theorists and politicians assume. effective rights are in fact indeterminate and incoherent. o The use of rights discourse stunts human conception and mystifies people about how law really works. o At least as prevailing in American law, the discourse of rights reflects and produces a kind of isolated individualism that hinders social solidarity and certain human connection. o Rights discourse can actually block off progressive movement for genuine democracy and justice. Rights should not be credited with progressive political advances.In The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU Law Review, cross Tushnet emphasizes the first theme in arguing that progressive lawyers overestimate the importance of their work because of an inflated and ludicrous view of the role of the Supreme Court in advancing progressive goals in the 1960s. That period of judicial leadership was aberrational in American write up and also more reactive and pro-active, depending on mass social movements rather than lawyers arguments. Legal victories als o are often not enforced judicial victories do not obviate the need for ongoing political mobilization.Legal victories may have ideological value even where they lack solid effects a court triumph can mark the ingress of previously excluded groups into the discourse of rights which holds ideological importance inside the nation. Nonetheless, legal and political cultures inside the United States can also produce large consequences from judicial losses for relatively powerless groups. Losing a case based on a claim of rights may in some cases lead the public to think that the claims have no merit and need not be given weight in policy debates.Robert Gordon similarly argues that even tell legal victories for blacks, for labor, for the poor, and for women did not succeed in fundamentally altering the social power structure. The labor movement secured the vitally important legal right to organize and strike, at the cost of fitting into a framework of legal regulation that certified th e legitimacy of managements making most of the important decisions about the conditions of work. Robert Gordon, Some Critical Theories of law and Their Critics, in The governing of Law 647 (David Kairys ed. , third edition, Basic Books New York, 1998).Moreover, rights are double-edged, as demonstrated in the discipline of civil rights. Floor entitlements can be turned into ceilings (youve got your rights, but thats all youll get). Formal rights without practical enforceable content are tardily substituted for real benefits. Anyway, the powerful can always assert counter rights (to vested property, to differential gear treatment according to merit, to association with ones own kind) to the rights of the disadvantaged. Rights conflict and the conflict cannot be resolved by appeal to rights. Id. , at 657-68.The content of contemporary American rights in particular must be mute as failing to advance progressive causes. Current constitutional doctrine, for example, severely favors so-called negative liberties (entitlements to be free of government interference) over positivist liberties (entitlements to government protection or aid) and thus reinforces the pernicious public/private distinction. That distinction implies that neither government nor society as a whole are responsible for providing persons with the resources they need to exercise their liberties, and indeed, any governmental action risks violating private liberties.Current freedom of speech doctrine accords protection to mercantile speech and pornography, limits governmental regulation of private contributions to political campaigns, and forbids sanctions for hate speech. Such rules operate in the often-stirring language of individual freedom, but their effect is more likely to be regressive than progressive. Rights are indeterminate and incoherent. As Mark Tushnet puts it, nothing whatever follows from a courts adoption of some legal rule (except insofar as the very fact that a court has esp ouse the rule has some social impact the ideological dimension with which the critique of rights is concerned. Progressive legal victories occur, according to the indeterminacy thesis, because of the surrounding social circumstances. At least as they figure in contemporary American legal discourse, rights cannot provide answer to real cases because they are cast at high levels of abstraction without clear application to particular problems and because different rights frequently conflict or present gaps. Often, judges try to resolve conflicts by attempting to balance individual rights against relevant social interests or by assessing the relative weight of two or more conflicting rights.These methods seem more telling of individual judicial sensibilities and political pressures than specific reach of specific rights. Moreover, primal rights are themselves internally incoherent. The right to freedom of contract, for example, combines freedom with control people should be free to b ind themselves to agreements the basic idea is private ordering. But the laws reliance on courts to enforce contracts reveals the doctrines portion out of power to the government to decide which agreements to enforce, and indeed what even counts as an agreement.Even more basically, freedom of contract implies that the freedom of both sides to the contract can be enhanced and protected, and yet no one stands able to know what actually was in the minds of parties on both sides. Resort to notions of objective intent and formalities replace commission to the freedom of the actual parties. 3. Legal rights stunt peoples imagination and mystify people about how law really works. The very language of a right, like the right to freedom of contract, appeals to peoples genuine desires for personal self-sufficiency and social solidarity, and yet masks the extent to which the social order makes both values elusive, rite Peter Gabel and Jay Fineman, in Contract Law as Ideology, in The Politic s of Law 496,498 (David Kairys, ed. , third edition, Basic Books New York 1998). Contract law in fact works to conceal the coercive system of relationships with general unfairness in contemporary market-based societies. The system of rights renders invisible the persistent utilitarian roles such as landlord, tenant, employer, and individual consumer of products produced by multinational conglomerates, that themselves reflect astray disparate degrees of economic and political power.Contract law is a significant feature in the massive denial of experiences of impotence and isolation and the acknowledgment for the system producing such experiences. Similar points can be made about other areas of law. Property rights, for example, imply promotion of individual freedom and security, and yet owners property rights are precisely the justification afforded to the control of others and arbitrary manners to wreak havoc over the lives of tenants, workers, and neighbors.Contract law artifi cially constrains analysis by focusing n a discrete promise and a discrete act of reliance rather than complex and often dispel communications and inevitable reliance by people on others than. Courts and legislatures jazz to some extent the power of these real features of peoples lives but the language of legal rules often leads decision makers to feel powerless to act on such recognition. Workers at a U. S. brand plant in Youngstown, Ohio and their lawyers tried to buy the plant after the company announced plans to close it.Federal trial and appellate judges acknowledged that the plant was the lifeblood of the community but nonetheless concluded that contract and property law provided no basis for preventing the company either from shutting down the plant or refusing to negotiate to sell it to the workers. Local 1330, United Steel Workers v. United States Steel Corp. 631 F. 2d 1264 (6th Cir. 1980). Gabel and Feinman conclude it was not the law that restrained the judges, but th eir own beliefs in the political theory of law.By recognizing the possibilities of social responsibility and solidarity that are congenital in the doctrine of reliance, they could have both provided the workers a remedy and helped to move contract law in a direction that would better find the legal ideals of freedom, equality, and community with the realization of these ideals in everyday life. Id. ,at 509. But the ideology of law made the judges feel they could not do so. more reading Staughton Lynd, the fight Against Shutdowns Youngstowns Steel Mill Closings (Single Jack Books San Pedro, CA 1982) Joseph William Singer, The reliance Interest in Property, 40 Stanford Law Rev. 11 (1988) Conventional rights discourse reflects and produces isolated individualism and hinders social solidarity and genuine human connection. The individualism pervading American law calls for the making of a sharp distinction between ones interests and those of others, feature with the belief that a p reference in conduct for ones own interests is legitimate, but that one should be willing to respect the rules that make it possible to coexist with others similarly self-interested. The form of conduct associated with individualism is self-reliance.This means an insistence on defining and achieving objectives without help from others (i. e. , without being dependent on them or asking sacrifices of them. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685(1976). As implemented in law, individualism means that there are some areas within which actors (whether actual individuals or groups) have list arbitrary discretion to pursue their own ends without regard to the impact of their actions on others.A legal right evokes the idea of a domain protected by law within which the individual is free to do as he or she pleases, and the arrangements ensuring that freedom are fair, neutral, and equitable. Judges must urge private ordering and avoid regulatin g or imposing their own values on the aggregate of individual choices. The state thereby polices all boundary crossings by private individuals and contributes to the pretense that individual, private, self-interested values are all that matter. Yet people need others as much as they need their own freedom.Altruism has roots as deep as individualism, and altruism urges sacrifice, sharing, cooperation, and attention to others. Rights help people deny the equal tug of individual freedom and social solidarity on peoples hearts and assert that legal rules resolve the tension by assuring that people relate to one another through the recognition and respect for each others separate, bounded spheres of self-interest. Yet this very mode of thinking renders it more difficult for individuals and for the legal system to act upon altruism, social cooperation, and relationships of generosity, reciprocity, and sacrifice.The legal structure of rules, and the abstracted roles (owner, employee etc. ) upon which it depends makes it more likely that people feel befuddled to counteract existing hierarchies of wealth and privilege or any sensed unfairness. Robert Gordon explains This process of allowing the structures we ourselves have built to mediate relations among us so as to make us see ourselves as performing abstract roles in a play that is produced by no human sanction is what is usually called (following Marx and such modern writers as Sartre and Lukacs) reification.It is a way people have of manufacturing necessity they build structures, then act as if (and rattling come to believe that) the structures they have built are determined by history, human nature, and economic law. Robert Gordon, Some Critical Theories of law and Their Critics, in the Politics of Law 650 (David Kairys, ed. , third edition, Basic Books New York 1998). Rights discourse actually can impede genuine democracy and justice. Rights discourse contributes to passivity, alienation, and a sense of ine vitability about the way things are.Even when relatively powerless groups win a legal victory, the rights involved can impede progressive social change. The victory may make those who won it complacent while galvanizing their opponents to do all they can to minimize the effects of the ruling. Conflicting rights or alternative interpretations of the same rights are always available. Conservatives can deploy the indeterminacy of rights for their benefit. apply the language of rights reinforces the individualistic ideology and claims of absolute power within individuals spheres of action that must be undermined if progressive social change is to become more possible.The language of rights perpetuates the misconception that legal argument is independent of political argument and social movements. Through rights language, those in power often grant strategic concessions of limits sets of rights to co-opt genuinely radical social movements. Progressives who use the language of rights thu s lend support to the ideology they must oppose. With the notable exception of Roberto Unger, who has proposed an alternative regime with immunity rights, destabilization rights, market rights, and solidarity rights, most overcritical legal scholars argue that rights do not advance and may impede political and social change.Rights are indeterminate and yet conceal the actual operations of power and human yearnings for connection and mutual aid. Contemporary legal and constitutional practice are less likely to provide avenues for gainsay unfair social and economic hierarchies than political movements, and a focus on law reform can divert and disengage those political movements. Criticism There is some element of truth in this theory, but difficult to believe that all rights enjoyed by people in a state are true to systems and traditions. Human society is dynamic and the custom change from time to time and from place to place.Rights correspond the different stages in the evolution of human society. Rights enjoyed people in a capitalist society, for example, are different from the enjoyed by people in a feudal society. There can be no unanimity opinion as to what historical rights are. Laski says, We do not mean by rights the grant of some his conditions possess in the childhood of the race, but lost in the pr of time. fewer theories have done greater harm to philosophy, or m frenzy to facts, than the notion that they represent the recovery of a inheritance. There is no easy age to which we may seek to return. References